Touro Law Review
Volume 13

Number 3

Article 31

1997

Public Welfare, Supreme Court Monroe County, Brown v. Wing

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
(1997) "Public Welfare, Supreme Court Monroe County, Brown v. Wing," Touro Law Review: Vol. 13: No. 3,
Article 31.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/31

This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

et al.: Public Welfare
PUBLIC WELFARE

N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1:
The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and
shal be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and
in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from
time to time determine.
SUPREME COURT
MONROE COUNTY
Brown v. Wingl
(decided Oct. 18 1996)
Petitioners, Douglas Brown and others, were denied public
assistance for six months from the time they moved to New York
pursuant to a 1995 amendment to New York's Social Services
Law. 2 Petitioners brought an action seeking a declaratory
judgment that the amendment and its implementation were
violations of the state's constitutional obligation to the needy, 3
the implicit federal constitutional right to travel, 4 and the Equal

1. 649 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1996).
2. Id. at 989-90. See ifta note 13 and accompanying text.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. This section provides: "The aid, care,
and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state
and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the
legislature may from time to time determine." Id.
4. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
The constitutional right to travel from one State to another ... occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right
that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.... [Tlhe
right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has
been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the
beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the
Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the
United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution.
Id. at 630-31 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1997], Art. 31

882

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

Protection Clause guarantees of the Federal 5 and New York
State 6 Constitutions. 7 The Supreme Court, Monroe County, held
that the amendment's classification of petitioners as welfare
recipients on bases other than need was a violation of New
York's constitutional responsibility to aid the needy, 8 the
amendment was unconstitutional in that the state's intent to
impede petitioners' implicit federal constitutional right to travel
was not justifiable as furthering a compelling state interest, 9 and
that because the amendment was unconstitutional with respect
petitioners' right to travel under the compelling state interest test,
it was unnecessary to apply the rational relationship test with
regards to the equal protection claim. 10
Petitioners had recently moved to New York from Florida and
Puerto Rico and were in need of financial assistance. 1 1 They
applied for a state public assistance program called Home Relief
that provides assistance to those individuals who are not eligible
for federal assistance. 12 However, New York Social Services
Law section 13la(3)(d) 13 was amended. 14 For six months after

5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
in pertinent part: "No state shall ...
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
6. N.Y. CONST.. art. I, § 11. This section provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
7. Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992, 993, 995.
8. Id.at 993.
9. Id.at 995.
10. Id.
11. Id.at 989.
12. Id.
This
13. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131a(3)(d) (McKinney 1995).
amendment provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the payment for any person
who applies for home relief or aid to dependent children benefits within
six months of establishing residency in the state, shall for the first six
months after establishing residency, be limited to the standard of
payment, if any, that would apply to the applicant under the laws of the
state, if any, in which he or she resided immediately prior to
establishing residency in this state ....
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establishing residency home relief was limited to that standard of
payment applied in the state where the applicant resided before
establishing residency in New York. 15 Since Florida and Puerto
Rico had no comparable program to New York's Home Relief,
petitioners were deprived of public assistance for their first six
months residency in New York State. 16 Petitioners challenged

New York Social Services Law section 131a(3)(d) and the court
decided the constitutionality of that statute with respect to the
state's constitutional obligation to aid the neety, the federal
constitutional right to travel, and both state and federal
constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws. 17
The first issue addressed by the court was whether the New
York Home Relief statute's classifications among welfare
recipients was constitutional in compliance with Article 17 of the
state constitution's provision that the state has an obligation to
those in need. 18 The court cited precedent that provides that
"[t]he Court of Appeals has consistently interpreted [section 1 of
Article 17] as one that forbids any classification of welfare
recipients by standards other than need itself." 19
In Tucker v. Toia,20 the plaintiffs were three persons under the
age of 21, not residing with their parents or responsible relatives,
who were deprived of all public assistance under Home Relief. 2 1
The Tucker court held that it is unconstitutional to deprive
admittedly needy individuals of Home Relief on any standard
other than need. 2 2 An attempt to distinguish Brown from Tucker
was made because in Brown, not all members of the class in
14. Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
15. Id.
16. Id.at 989-90.
17. Id. at 996.
18. Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
19. Id.at 992 (citing Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 371 N.E.2d 449,
452, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (1977)).

20. 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977).
21. Tucker, 43 N.Y.2d at 5, 371 N.E.2d at 450, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
22. Id.at 9, 371 N.E.2d at 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 728. "May the
Legislature deny all aid to certain individuals who are admittedly needy, solely

on the basis of criteria having nothing to do with need? Today we hold that it
may not." Id.
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which petitioners were members were completely denied benefits,
while in Tucker, all members of the same classification as the
petitioners were denied public assistance. 23 That differentiation
was not accepted by the Brown court. 24 The court held that
drawing classifications among those individuals who are tagged
as "needy," is unconstitutional and would amount to a change in
the definition of "need," which is a function that is legislative,
rather than judicial, in nature. 25 On the issue of the state's
responsibility of supporting the needy, the court held that section
131a(3)(d) of the Social Services Law, "which reduces benefits
for some of the needy is as much an unconstitutional
26
classification as one that eliminates them altogether."
The second issue that the Brown court addressed was whether
Social Services Law section 131a(3)(d) violated the implicit
federal constitutional right to travel. 27 The court stated that
statutes that reprove the right to travel must be justified as a
means to a compelling state interest. 28 In relying on Shapiro v.
Thompson, 29 the court held that the state cannot attempt to keep
indigents seeking increased welfare benefits out of its borders,
just as it may not attempt to keep indigents in general from
residing within the state. 30 Shapiro case dealt with a state statute
that denied Aid to Families With Dependent Children benefits to
new residents of a state for a one year period. 3 1 The Court
recognized a state's valid interest in retaining the financial
integrity of its public assistance programs, but stated that the
23. Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
24. Id. The court pointed out that other members of petitioner Brown's
class may have been receiving reduced benefits. Id. "Any distinction between

partial and total reduction of aid, however, is one without a difference." Id.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1968)).
394 U.S. 618 (1968).

30. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631.

"Implicit in any such distinction is the

notion that indigents who enter a State with hope of securing higher welfare

benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who do not take this
consideration into account." Id.
31. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618.
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state may not utilize invidious classifications to accomplish that
goal. 32
The State in Brown attempted to advance the argument that
Social Services Law section 13la(3)(d) is temporary in nature as
opposed to the statute in Shapiro that denied assistance for a
year, "leaving them without a basic means of support." 33 The
court, however, rejected this argument noting that "[o]ne can as
well starve in six months as in twelve." 34 A second argument by
the state was to distinguish Brown from Shapiro in that the later
case involved federal funds, as opposed to state benefits in the
former. 35 The Brown court, once again, cited "the basic
necessaries of life" as reasoning for rejecting any distinction
36
between federal and state public assistance.
Finally, under the issue of the statute's constitutionality with
respect to an individual's right to travel, the state argued that its
intention in promulgating the legislation was to discourage needy
individuals from traveling to New York, rather than to impede
their travel. 37 The court looked at the Petitioners' residence in
the state as evidence that individuals were not deterred by the
statute from traveling into New York. 3 8 The court concluded
that "the right to travel is implicated whenever there is an
'unequal distribution of rights and benefits' among residents of
the state based on time of residency." 39 Social Services Law
section 13la(3)(d) was held unconstitutional because the state's
infringement on the implicit federal constitutional right to travel
40
was not justified by a compelling state interest.
The final issue that the court addressed was whether the state
statute violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 633.
Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 995. (citations omitted).
Id.
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New York State Constitutions. 41 In reconciling the standards of
review between equal protection and the right to travel the court
cited United States Supreme Court precedent: "Once we find a
burden on the right to migrate the standard of review is the same
[for an equal protection review]. Laws which burden that right
must be necessary to further a compelling state interest." 42 The
court dismissed further discussion on the equal protection
challenge because the statute implicated the right to travel in such
a way that it was unnecessary to apply the rational relationship
test. 43 The court finally held that because Social Services Law
section 13la(3)(d) was found unconstitutional under Article XVII
of the New York State Constitution, "the court [did] not with to
44
lengthen an already extensive discussion with dicta."
In conclusion, New York Social Services Law section
13la(3)(d) was struck down as unconstitutional pursuant to
violations of the following constitutional provisions: the state's
constitutional obligations of public assistance to the needy as
provided by Article XVII of the New York State Constitution;
the implied Federal Constitutional right to travel; and both New
York State and Federal Constitution's rights to equal protection
of the laws. Under the state analysis of providing financial
assistance to those in need, the statute was found unconstitutional
because the classification drawn between those individuals who
were to benefit versus those who would be denied was based on
elements other than need. According to federal analysis of the
implied right to travel, the state failed to show a compelling state
interest that justified impeding indigents from traveling to the
New York state and establish residency.
Finally, without
applying the appropriate rational relationship test commonly used
in Equal Protection claims, the court declined to directly address
the issue under both New York and Federal Constitutional law

41. Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 995.

42. Id. (citing Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S.
898 (1985)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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because it had already found Social Services Law § 131-a(3)(d)
unconstitutional under the first two claims.
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